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TORT LAW-EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIMS 
IN DES LITIGATION: INJURY WITHOUT REMEDY-Payton v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540,437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Diethylstilbestrol (DES)I is a drug which was administered to 
an estimated three million pregnant women between 1941 and 1971 
for the purpose of preventing miscarriage. 2 The ingestion of DES by 
mothers during pregnancy has been found to cause adenocarcinoma, 
a fast spreading and deadly disease which may require radical sur­
gery.3 The ingestion of DES also caused adenoses, precancerous 
vaginal and cervical growths which may spread to other areas of the 
body. Women who suffer from this condition must be monitored bi­
annually by biopsr or colposcopics examinations. A large percent­
age of the daughters of these women have contracted these and other 
related diseases; another large percentage suffer emotional distress in 
anticipation of developing a manifestation of some disease. In an 
I. Diethylstilbestrol is a chrystalline synthetic estrogenic substance capable of pro­
ducing all the pharmocologic and therapeutic responses attributed to natural estrogens. 
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 394 (24th ed. 1982). 
2. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1977, at 18, col. 3. See also Sindell v. Abbott Labora­
tories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597, 609 P.2d 924, 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 (1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 912 (1980); Comment, IJES and a Proposed Theory ofEnterprise Liability, 46 
FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 964-67 (1978). 
3. See Heinonen, "IJiethylstilbestrol in Pregnancy; Frequency ofExposure and Us­
age Pal/ems", 3 CANCER 573, 576 (Mar. 1973); LaBarthe, "IJesign and Preliminary Obser­
vations ofNational Cooperative IJiethylstilbestrol Adenoses Project", 51 J. OF OBST. AND 
GYN. 453, 457 (1978). These studies indicate that the use of DES by pregnant women 
was greater in the Massachusetts area than in other parts of the country. See also, Berger 
& Goldstien, "Impaired Reproductive Performances in IJES-Exposed Women", 55 OB­
STET. GYNECOL. 25 (1980); Barnes, Colton, Gunderstein, Noller, Tilley, Stram a, Tow­
send, Hatab & O'Brien "Fertility & Outcome ofPregnancy in Women Exposed in Utero to 
IJiethylstilbestrol", 302 N. ENG. J. MED. 609 (1980). 
4. A biopsy is "[tJhe process of removing tissue from living patients for diagnostic 
examination." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 192 (24th ed. 1982). 
5. A colposcope is an instrument that "magnifies cells of the vagina and cervix in 
vivo to allow direct observation and study of these tissues." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIc­
TIONARY 301 (24th ed. 1982). 
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attempt to allay some of their fears, the women in the latter category 
undergo the periodic examinations which are painful, traumatic, and 
expensive.6 These women present a difficult legal issue when seeking 
recourse for their emotional distress because they do not display 
physical manifestations of harm.7 In Payton v. Abbott Labs 8 the 
plaintiffs, commonly referred to as "DES daughters", were denied a 
cause of action for redress from the drug companies that may have 
negligently manufactured, marketed, and promoted the drug.9 The 
Supreme Judicial Court was faced with the difficult problem of de­
lineating guidelines as to who could recover and who would be re­
sponsible for injuries sustained as the result of the negligent 
manufacturing of DES.IO The plaintiffsll brought a class action suit 
in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
against the defendant corporations that have manufactured the drug 
DESI2. The plaintiffs, who allegedly had been exposed to the drug in 
utero,13 sought recovery for the defendants' negligence in marketing 
the drug as a preventative of miscarriages before adequately testing 
it. 14 The plaintiffs did not have any of the symptoms of the illnesses 
linked to DES, but were emotionally distressed by the potential 
manifestation of such illnesses. 15 The district court sought certifica­
tion of questions of Massachusetts law from the Supreme Judicial 
6. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. 
Rptr. 132, 133 (1980). 
7. Conversely, women who have contracted one of the diseases proven to have 
been caused by transmission of DES from the mother to the fetus state a cause of action 
for relief. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. 
Rptr. 132 (1980). 
8. 386 Mass. 540,437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). 
9. fd at 574-75, 437 N.E.2d at 190. 
10. The issues of negligence and causation were not before the court in Payton. 
386 Mass. at 545, 437 N.E.2d at 174. The certified questions assumed that the defendant 
was negligent and that the negligence caused the plaintiffs injuries. fd 
II. The plaintiffs in this class action included all women: 

"I) who were exposed to diethylstilbestrol "DES" in utero; 

2) whose exposure occurred in Massachusetts; 

3) who were born in Massachusetts; 

4) who [were) domiciled in Massachusetts when they receiv[ed) notice of [the) ac­

tion; and 
5) who have not developed uterine or vaginal cancer." Payton v. Abbott Labs. 83 
F.R.D. 382, 386 (D. Mass. 1979). 
12. The defendants included Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Co., Merck & Co., 
Inc., Rexall Drug Co., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., and Upjohn Co. 386 Mass. at 540 n.2, 
437 N.E.2d at 171 n.2. 
13. 386 Mass. at 542, 437 N.E.2d at 173. 
14. fd at 543, 437 N.E.2d at 173. 
15. fd at 542-43, 437 N.E.2d at 173. 
1984 	 DES-Injury Without Remedy 1039 
Court because Massachusetts law was not settled on the issues 
presented. 16 
In a lengthy decision, the Supreme Judicial Court responded to 
the district court's request by first stating that Massachusetts did not 
recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis­
tress absent physical harm. 17 The court advanced the various policy 
reasons that favored this result, most notably the fear of frivolous 
and ficticious lawsuits and the imposition of undue liability on those 
who are merely negligent. IS The court then applied a wrongful life 
theory and held that the plaintiffs would be barred from recovery if a 
trier of fact concluded that a plaintiff would probably not have been 
born except for the mother's ingestion of DES.19 The court based 
this result on the theory that measuring such damages, a comparison 
16. The certified questions were stated as follows: 
I. 	 'Does Massachusetts recognize a right of action for emotional distress and 
anxiety caused by the negligence of a defendant, in the absence of any evi­
dence of physical harm, where such emotional distress and anxiety are the 
result of an increased statistical likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer seri­
ous disease in the future?' 
Id. 	 at 544, 437 N.E.2d at 174. 
2. 	 'If the trier of fact concludes that a plaintiff would probably not have been 
born except for the mother's ingestion of DES, is that plaintiff barred from 
recovery because of physical or emotional damage suffered as a result of the 
mother's ingestion of DES?' 
Id. 	 at 557, 437 N.E.2d at 181. . 
3. 	 'Does Massachusetts recognize a right of action for injury to a plaintiff in 
utero resulting from ingestion of a drug by her mother?' 
Id. at 560, 437 N.E.2d at 182 (emphasis in original). 
3a. 	'If the answer to question 3 is affirmative, is such a right of action available 
to a plaintiff whose mother ingested the drug prior to your Honorable 
Court's decision in Torigan v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, [225 
N.E.2d 926] (1967), assuming that it is not established that the fetus was 
probably viable at the time of the injury?' .... 
3b. 	 'If the answer to question 3 is affirmative, is such right of action available 
under any circumstances to a plaintiff whose mother ingested the drug prior 
to your Honorable Court's decision in Keyes v. Construction Servs., Inc., 
340 Mass. 633, [165 N.E.2d 912] (1960)?' 
Id. 	 at 564, 437 N.E.2d at 185. 
4. 	 'Assuming that the evidence does not warrant a conclusion that the defend­
ants conspired together, or engaged in concerted action, or established 
safety standards through a trade association, may the defendant manufac­
turers, who probably supplied some of the DES ingested by the mothers of 
the plaintiff class be held liable to members of the plaintiffs' class when 
neither the plaintiffs nor defendants can identify which manufacturer's 
DES was ingested by which mothers? 
Id. 	 at 570, 437 N.E.2d at 188. 
17. 	 Id. at 544-57, 437 N.E.2d at 174-81. 
18. 	 Id. at 552-53, 437 N.E.2d at 178-79. 
19. 	 Id. at 557-60, 437 N.E.2d at 181-82. 
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of the value of life to that of non-life, is beyond the competence of 
the judicial system.20 Further, the court stated that Massachusetts 
did recognize a cause of action for injury to a plaintiff in utero result­
ing from ingestion of a drug by her mother.21 The court noted that 
this conclusion was in accord with recent Massachusetts case law re­
jecting the argument based, in part, from the fear of speculative 
damages.22 The court stated that the possibilities of ficticious claims 
and recovery of damages based on speculation should not bar an 
action for injuries whose existence can be proven by medical evi­
dence. 23 Finally, the court found that it could not actually answer 
the district court's inquiry as to whether the named defendants could 
be held liable to a member of the plaintiffs class where neither the 
plaintiff nor defendant could identify which manufacturer's product 
was ingested by plaintiffs mother.24 The court stated that this ques­
tion did not assume that the plaintiffs would be able to establish that 
the defendants were negligent and that the question of identity was 
separate from that ofnegligence.25 The court did indicate, however, 
that it would reject the market share liability theory,26 and that re­
covery might be permissible from those defendants to the extent of 
their participation in the DES market.27 
Although Payton dealt specifically with four issues, this note 
primarily will analyze the court's holdings concerning recovery for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress unaccompanied by physical 
20. Id at 559. 437 N.E.2d at 182. 
21. Id at 560-64, 437 N.E.2d at 182-85. 
22. Id 
23. Id at 563, 437 N.E.2d at 184. 
24. Id at 570, 437 N.E.2d at 188. 
25. Id 
26. Id at 571-74, 437 N.E.2d at 188-90. For more information on the "market 
share" theory of recovery, see Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 Cal. Reprt. 132, 145-46 
607 P.2d 924, 937-38, 27 Cal. 3d 588, 612-13. In Sindell, the court held that women 
afflicted with a disease caused by DES could recover from the defendant drug companies 
on a market share liability theory. Id Under this theory each defendant will be liable 
for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it dem­
onstrates that it could not have made the product which caused the plaintiffs injuries. In 
effect, this theory shifts the required burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant to guar­
antee that plaintiffs will prevail on the causation issue. In Payton, the court rejected the 
market share theory on the grounds that public policy favors the development and mar­
keting of better drugs and that imposition of such a broad liability would impede such 
medical advancements. 368 Mass. at 573-74, 437 N.E.2d at 189-90. 
27. 386 Mass. at 570-74, 437 N.E.2d at 188-90. The court's response indicates that, 
on an adequate record, it would perhaps relax the traditional identification requirement 
to a standard somewhere in between the liberal market share theory and the strict notion 
that in order for a party to be held negligent for an injury the party must be identified as 
a cause of the injuries. Id at 574, 437 N.E.2d at 190. 
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injury and for wrongful life. First, the note will trace the develop­
ment of law in the areas of emotional distress and wrongful life, and 
the rationale underlying the court's holdings will be summarized. 
The court's treatment of the issue of emotional distress will then be 
analyzed in light of the prevailing policy considerations which mili­
tate against recovery when there is no physical injury and examined 
as to the applicability of past precedent of "bystander" cases. The 
note will also discuss the court's holding that there can be no recov­
ery for a claim of wrongful life. The note will then demonstrate that 
with regard to issues of emotional distress, the prevailing policy con­
siderations that militate against recovery for emotional distress in a 
case such as Payton are insufficient to invalidate the plaintiffs claim 
for relief and the court's reliance of "bystander" cases is in fact mis­
placed. With regard to the court's holding that recovery will be 
barred on a claim for wrongful life, the note will illustrate that the 
policy considerations may not be sufficient in this case to justify de­
nial of relief and that the court may have imposed a barrier to recov­
ery which is inappropriate in the present case. 
II. THE DEVELOPING LAW 
A. Recoveryfor Emotional Distress 
1. Background 
Courts have been reluctant to recognize the infliction of mental 
disturbance as an independant tort where the defendant's conduct is 
merely negligent. The major argument advanced in support of this 
is the danger of vexatious suits and frivolous c1aims.28 Thus, when a 
defendant's negligence causes only mental distress, without accom­
panying physical injury or consequences, and no other independent 
basis for tort liability is present, the majority view is that there can 
be no recovery.29 Therefore, when emotional distress is negligently 
inflicted, proof of physical impact, injury or manifestation is re­
quired to sustain a cause of action.3D 
28. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54 at 328-29 (3d ed. 1964). 
29. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Iowa 1981); Hughes v. 
Moore, 214 Va. 27, 34, 197 S.E.2d 214,219 (1973); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 
So. 2d 898, 902 (Miss. 1981); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 139 Vt. 
138, 143-44,425 A.2d 92, 95 (1980); Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500-01, 408 A.2d 728, 
733-34 (1979); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Me. 1979). 
30. The plaintiffs in Payton and in similar DES cases could, in the alternative, 
claim that they in fact suffered "physical harm" at the cellular level as a result of their 
exposure to DES. Under this approach, plaintiffs would argue that there is a microscopic 
process by which normal genital-tract cells in a female are altered as a result of DES 
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In 1897, Massachusetts adopted the "impact rule" to deal with 
claims of emotional distress in Spade v. Lynn & Boslon R.R. 31 The 
court denied relief for mental distress unless it was preceeded by 
some form of bodily injury.32 In the early 1900's, however, Massa­
chusetts began to allow "parasitic recovery" for negligently inflicted 
emotional distress. Under this theory, plaintiffs could recover for 
emotional distress as an additional element of damages if the de­
fendant's negligence directly caused physical injuries.33 The degree 
of emotional distress was irrelevant, and even the most trivial claims 
could "attach" themselves to physical injury and be recovered. The 
term "physical", as used for applying a "physical consequence" rule, 
has been articulated as an indication that the condition or illness for 
which recovery is sought is one that can be objectively determined.34 
exposure so they become more susceptible than normal cells to being transformed into 
malignant cells. The plaintiffs may also argue that even if DES is not found to have 
caused "physical harm" to every member of the plaintiff class,. the transmission of DES 
to the fetus in utero constitutes an "impact" sufficient to permit recovery for emotional 
distress under the already well-established "impact rule". Plaintiffs Brief to Mass. SJC 
on Ques. I, 3 and 4 at 10, Pay/on. If the plaintiffs could prove these theories at trial, the 
fact that Massachusetts does not recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress ab­
sent physical injury would be irrelevant. Unfortunately, however, both these alternative 
theories must be established by expert medical testimony which, considering the likeli­
hood that opposing counsel will introduce his own expert testimony to the contrary, re­
sults in a battle of the experts thereby making the alternative theories difficult to establish 
in court. It therefore remains important to deal with the issue of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress in DES cases when there is no evidence of accompanying physical 
injury. 
31. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
32. Id at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. The plaintiff in Spade had been a passenger on a 
crowded car of the Lynn & Boston railroad. An employee of the railroad was found to 
be negligent in the removal of an unruly passenger thus frightening the plaintiff, causing 
him emotional shock and consequent physical injury. Id at 285-86. Justice Allen recog­
nized emotional distress as an injury and admitted that the denial of relief was based on 
administrative convenience: 
The exemption from liability for mere fright, terror, alarm, or anxiety does not 
rest on the assumption that these do not constitute an actual injury. They do in 
fact deprive one of enjoyment and of comfort, cause real suffering, and to a 
greater or less extent disqualify one for the time being from doing the duties of 
life.... 
[T)he real reason for refusing damages sustained from mere fright. . . rests on 
the ground that in practice it is impossible satisfactorily to administer any other 
rule. 
Id at 288, N.E. at 88-89. 
33. See Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902); Cam­
eron v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 182 Mass. 310, 65 N.E. 385 (1902); Driscoll v. 
Gaffy, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N.E. 1010 (1910); Barney v. Magenis, 241 Mass. 268, 135 N.E. 
142 (1922). 
34. See in re United States, 418 F.2d 264,269 (1st Cir. 1969). In that case the court 
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The issue of recovery for emotional distress also appeared in 
cases in which the plaintiff was not a direct victim of the defendant's 
negligence, but was a bystander witnessing an accident in which a 
third party was injured by defendant's negligence. With the surge of 
"bystander recovery" cases infiltrating the courts, many jurisdictions 
adopted the "zone of danger" theory of recovery.35 For example, in 
a typical "bystander" case a plaintiff who witnesses the occurrence of 
an injury to another would be allowed to recover for negligent inflic­
tion of emotional distress if he or she were in the "zone of danger"; 
that is if it were possible that the plaintiff could have been physically 
injured himself. 
In Dziokonski v. Babineau ,36 however, Massachusetts adopted 
the landmark theory promulgated by Dillon v. Legg37 , which allowed 
recovery to a bystander plaintiff regardless of whether he or she was 
within the "zone of danger".38 Under the Dillon approach, the plain­
tiff was required to state the usual elements of a negligence claim 
and prove that the plaintiff suffered a "substantial physical injury as 
a result of the shock and trauma."39 The Dziokonski court, there­
fore, held that a person who negligently caused emotional distress 
which led to physical injuries may be liable for those injuries even if 
the injured person was neither threatened with nor sustained any 
applied the "impact rule" to grant recovery to survivor of a capsized Coast Guard vessel 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff crew member was thrown into the 
sea when his ship capsized. Subsequently he became very depressed and emotionally 
upset, perspired a great deal, and wrung his hands constantly. Thereafter he was unable 
to work at sea. Id. at 267. The court held that the fact that he was thrown into the water 
was sufficient to meet the impact requirement. Id. at 269. 
35. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 252-53 (3d ed. 1964); see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965); see also Jelley v. LaFiame, \08 N.H. 
471,238 A.2d 728 (1968); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603,258 N.W. 497 (1935); 
Whetham v. Bismark Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972). 
36. 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). In Dziokonski, a child was struck by a 
bus operated by defendant. The child's mother was in the immediate vicinity and went 
to the scene where she found her child lying on the ground. The mother died in the 
ambulance as a result of physical and emotional shock, distress, and anguish. Id. at 557, 
380 N.E.2d at 1296. The father "suffered an aggravated gastric ulcer, a coronary occlu­
sion, physical and emotional shock, distress, and anguish as a result of the injury to his 
daughter and the death of his wife." Id.; see also Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 
Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (children and wife of worker who was seri­
ously injured as a result of employer's negligence had cause of action against employer 
sufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment for shock and resulting physical 
impairment from seeing him in the hospital). 
37. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
38. 375 Mass. at 568, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
39. 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. 
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direct physical harm.40 The court stated that the "so-called 'impact' 
rule" of Spade 41 was no longer a necessary predicate to recovery for 
emotional distress42 and tha\ the "zone of danger" rule lacked logical 
support.43 
A minority of courts have recognized a cause of action for negli­
gent infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical in­
jury44. This minority has refused to allow the requirement of 
physical harm to stand as an artificial bar to recovery, but instead 
has applied foreseeability and duty as the governing standard.45 The 
minority view recognizes that fears of unlimited liability and fraudu­
lent claims are valid concerns but ones which must be weighed 
against a plaintiffs serious emotional injury directly caused by de­
fendant's negligence.46 
2. The Payton Court's Treatment of Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress 
In addressing the issue of whether a cause of action for negli­
40. 375 Mass. at 568-69, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
41. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
42. 375 Mass. at 556, 380 N.E.2d at 1296. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, 
decided the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress on the "zone of danger" and 
"impact" theories in Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 431 N.E.2d 920 (1982). 
The Cimino court held that plaintiff could recover for negligently inflicted emotional 
distress based on the fact that he was indisputably in danger of being hit by the car, and 
the impact of his son knocking him down after the car hit the son was sufficient to consti­
tute an "impact" and physical injury. ld at 333, 431 N.E.2d at 927. 
43. 375 Mass. at 564, 389 N.E.2d at 1300. 
The zone of danger rule has something to commend it as a measure of the limits 
of liability. It permits a relatively easy determination of the persons who might 
recover for emotionally caused bodily injury by including only those to whom 
contemporaneous bodily harm of some sort might reasonably have been fore­
seen. . . . The problem. . . is that it is an inadequate measure of the reason­
able foreseeability of the possibility of physical injury resulting from a parent's 
anxiety arising from harm to his child. The reasonable foreseeability of such a 
physical injury to a parent does not tum on whether that parent was or was not 
a reasonable prospect for a contemporaneous injury because of the defendant's 
negligent conduct. 
ld 
44. See, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981); 
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); 
Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 
P.2d 758 (1974). 
45. E.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 174, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (1970); 
Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 652, 406 A.2d 300, 304 (1979). 
46. E.g., Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 652-53, 406 A.2d 300, 304 (1979). See 
a/so, Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 152-55,404 A.2d, 672, 678-81; Molien v. Kaiser Founda­
tion Hospital, 27 Cal. 3d 916,930-31,616 P.2d 813,821,167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 840 (1980). 
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gent infliction of emotional distress exists unless accompanied by 
physical injury, the Pay/on court,47 relying heavily on Dziokonski,48 
held that to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress the 
plaintiff must allege and prove that he or she suffered physical harm 
as a result of defendant's conduct.49 The court stated that "the phys­
ical harm suffered must either cause or be the result of the alleged 
emotional distress," be discemable "by objective symptomalogy and 
substantiated by expert medical testimony," and the emotional dis­
tress accompanying the physical injury must be reasonably foresee­
able.50 The court stated that it was "unwilling . . . to impose upon 
the judicial system and potential defendants the burden of dealing 
with claims of damages for emotional distress that are trivial, eva­
nescent, temporary, feigned, or imagined, in order to insure that oc­
casional claims of a more serious nature receive judicial 
resolution."51 
Justice Wilkins, joined by two other justices, dissented from the 
majority's treatment of recovery for emotional distress.52 Justice 
Wilkins pointed out that objective corroboration of the emotional 
distress alleged was available in that accepted medical practice indi­
cated the need for the plaintiffs to undergo periodic examinations 
that were expensive, traumatic and painfu1.53 
Justice Wilkins also noted that the rationale underlying the ma­
jority view rested upon three assumptions and those assumptions 
were not valid in Pay/on .54 As to the first assumption, that emo­
tional distress which did not manifest itself physically was normally 
trivial, the dissent asserted that Massachusetts had allowed recovery 
for minor emotional distress unrelated to the physical injury which 
accompanied it55 and, more importantly, emotional distress was not 
47. The justices in the majority of the emotional distress issue were Chief Justice 
Hennessey and Justices Lynch, O'Connor and Nolan. See 386 Mass. at 540, 578, 437 
N.E.2d at In, 192. 
48. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
49. 386 Mass. at 555, 437 N.E.2d at 180. 
50. Id at 556-57, 437 N.E.2d at 181. 
51. Id at 555, 437 NE.2d at 180. 
52. Id at 578, 437 N.E.2d at 192 (Wilkins, Liacos and Abrams, J.J., dissenting). 
53. Id at 578-79, 437 N.E.2d at 192. 
54. Id at 579-81, 437 N.E.2d at 192-93. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 436A comment b (1965). 
55. 386 Mass. at 579, 437 N.E.2d at 193 (Wilkins, Liacos and Abrams, J.J., dissent­
ing) (citing Barney v. Magenis, 241 Mass. 268, 135 N.E. 142 (1922); Homans v. Boston 
Elevated Railway Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902). 
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always trivial. 56 The second assumption, that physical harm guaran­
teed the genuineness of the claim, the dissent noted that the court 
had rejected the fear of fraudulent claims as a basis for denying a 
cause of action for emotional distress and had recognized that this 
was a jury question.57 The third assumption, that the defendant's 
fault is not so great as to require making good a purely mental in­
jury, the dissent stated that the degree of defendant's fault, whether 
reckless, intentional or negligent, bares no relation to the genuine­
ness or existence of claim.58 Justice Wilkins stated that he strongly 
opposed the inhibited foresight of the majority: "The inertia which 
results from reliance on a 'majority view' guarantees a glacial devel­
opment of the law."59 
B. Recoveryfor "Wrongful Life" 
1. Background 
The prototypical "wrongful life" claim is an action by a geneti­
cally or congenitally defective infant against a physician for negli­
gently failing to prevent the infant's birth.60 Typically, a physical 
examination will negligently fail to detect or warn a pregnant wo­
man of a possible birth defect. The mother of the defective infant 
alleges that had she been aware of the potential deformity she would 
have aborted the pregnancy. In essence it is an action seeking dam­
ages for birth itself and it does not allege that the physician's negli­
gence caused the deformity.61 
Recovery for a wrongful life cause of action has been denied for 
primarily four reasons. First, it has been asserted that the measure­
ment of damages is impossible because the normal measure of dam­
ages would compare the condition that the plaintiff would have been 
in, had the defendant not been negligent, with the plaintiffs im­
paired condition as a result of the negligence.62 In such a case, the 
56. 386 Mass. at 579, 437 N.E.2d at 193 (Wilkins, Liacos and Abrams, 1.1., 
dissenting). 
57. Id. at 580, 437 N.E.2d at 193 (Wilkins, Liacos and Abrams, 1.1., dissenting) 
(citing Dziokonski, 375 Mass. at 566, 380 N.E.2d at 1307). 
58. Id. at 581, 437 N.E.2d at 193-94 (Wilkins, Liacos and Abrams, 1.1., dissenting). 
59. Id. 
60. See generally Note, Wrongful Life and a Fundamental Right to be Born Healthy: 
Park v. Chessin; Becker v. Schwartz, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 537 (1978). 
61. Id. 
62. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.l. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967). There, the 
child's mother contracted rubella while pregnant and the doctor failed to inform the 
patient of the possibility of the child being born with birth defects. The child was born 
with severe birth defects. Id. at 24-25, 229 A.2d at 690. 
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measure of damages would be the difference between the plaintiffs 
life with defects and no life at all, and such a determination is impos­
sible to make.63 , 
The second reason advanced to deny a cause of action for 
wrongful life is that the infant has not suffered any damage cogniza­
ble at law by being brought into existence.64 The underlying ration­
ale of this view is that "life-whether experienced with or without a 
major physical handicap-is more precious than non-life."65 
It has been suggested, however, that although nonexistence 
should not be encouraged over life, the focus should be concentrated 
on the child's impaired state.66 Damages then could be assessed in 
the form of pain and suffering to be endured during the life of the 
child as well as any special pecuniary loss resulting from the im­
paired condition.67 
Recently, the California Supreme Court in Turpin v. Sorlini,68 
questioned whether the public policy consideration of disavowing 
the sancitity and value of less than perfect human life provides a 
sound basis for rejecting the child's tort action.69 First, the court 
asserted that it was difficult to imagine how an award of damages to 
a severely handicapped or suffering child would "disavow" the value 
of life.70 Second, the court noted that our society places the highest 
value on human life, but to state that as a "matter of law" impaired 
life was preferable to nonexistence was inaccurate and unjust.71 
63. Id 
64. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 428-29, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979). In Berman, plain­
tiff alleged that due to her advanced age at the time she conceived, the risk that the child 
would be afflicted with Down's Syndrome was sufficiently great so as to warrant the 
defendant to inform her of the risk and of the availability of amniocentesis. Id at 425, 
404 A.2d at 10. 
65. Id at 429, 404 A.2d at 12. 
66. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 828-31, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 477, 488-90 (1980). 
67. Id at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. 
68. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). The Turpin court 
limited recovery to special damages (i.e., those which are not the necessary or inevitable 
result of an injury, e.g., medical expenses and loss of earnings) for extraordinary ex­
penses necessary for treatment of the hereditary ailment; and not general damages (i.e., 
those which flow directly from the injury, e.g. , pain and suffering). 
69. Id at 232-33, 643 P.2d at 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45. 
70. Id at 233, 643 P.2d at 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45. 
71. Id at 233,643 P.2d at 926, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345. 
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2. The Payton Court's Treatment of Wrongful Life 
Essentially, the Payton majority72 applied the rationale that 
other courts have used to deny recovery for a wrongful life cause of 
action. The court held that even if a trier of fact found by a prepon­
derance of the evidence that the plaintiff would not have been born 
except for her mother's ingestion of DES, the plaintiff would be 
barred from recovery for a physical or emotional harm.73 In so 
holding the court expressed its concern regarding the difficulty of 
assessing damages, stating that an attempt to make such a compari­
son would be beyond the competence of the judicial system.74 
Chief Justice Hennessey dissented from the majority opinion on 
this issue primarily because he found the full scope of the majority's 
view as being adverse to basic tort principles.75 Hennessey viewed 
the court's holding as providing "a negligent manufacturer of a life 
sustaining product with an excuse from liability whenever it can 
show that its product probably saved a plaintiffs life."76 The Chief 
Justice also objected to the use of the "wrongful life" rationale as a 
determinative factor in barring recovery in Payton. He stated that 
the problem with the rationale was its basis on the failure to warn,77 
whereas in Payton, the plaintiffs also alleged inadequate testing as a 
basis of the defendant's negligence. Thus, because the plaintiffs 
state of life was caused by the drug, and not the defendant's negli­
gence, the rationale applied in "wrongful life" cases was not applica­
ble in Payton .78 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Emotional JJistress 
1. Policy 
Various policy reasons have been asserted against the recogni­
tion of negligent infliction of emotional distress absent physical in­
jury as a valid cause of action. One such reason is the lack of 
knowledge and medical technology in the area of mental illness.79 
72. The justices in the majority on the issue of wrongful life were Wilkins, Liacos, 
Abrams, O'Connor, Nolan and Lynch. 386 Mass. at 540, 575, 437 N.E.2d at 172, 190. 
73. 386 Mass. at 559, 437 N.E.2d at 182. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 575-76,437 N.E.2d at 190-92 (Hennessey, C.]., dissenting). 
76. Id. at 576, 437 N.E.2d at 191. 
77. Id. at 577-78, 437 N.E.2d at 192. 
78. Id. 
79. 386 Mass. at 552-53, 437 N.E.2d at 175. 
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The development of medical science, however, has advanced suffi­
ciently so as to enable a causal link between the psychic damage 
suffered and shock or fright caused by the defendant to be estab­
lished.80 It is difficult, if not impossible to draw a clear legal line 
between physical injury caused by emotional distress and pure emo­
tional distress. 81 Emotional or mental distress, in some circum­
stances, may have a debilitating effect on an individual's capacity to 
carry on the normal functions of life. Today, society recognizes 
mental disturbances to be as severe an injury as many physical ill­
nesses.82 The emotional distress alleged in Payton clearly is caused 
by the taking of a drug which is medically proven to cause cancer 
and other diseases.83 The "DES Daughters" participate in painful 
and traumatic periodic examinations to detect DES-related potential 
illnesses, thus providing the causal connection between the distress 
suffered and the negligence of the defendant. 
Perhaps the most persuasive policy reason advanced for the 
physical injury requirement is that it serves as a screening device to 
false claims. It has been asserted, however, that the courts are 
equipped to deal with ficticious lawsuits when they arise. The judge 
or jury is able to distinguish between those claims which are real and 
those which are contrived.84 The Supreme Judicial Court has previ­
ously stated that "we constantly depend on efficient investigations 
80. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. at 152, 404 A.2d at 678. In Sinn action was brought 
against the driver of an automobile which struck and killed a child, to recover psycholog­
ical damage sustained by the child's sister and to recover for damages sustained by the 
child's mother due to the emotional stress arising from her observation of the accident. 
Id. at 150-52,404 A.2d at 674-75. It has been assumed that medical science is unable to 
establish that the psychic injuries in fact resulted from defendant's negligence but the 
development of psychiatric tests and the refinement of diagnostic techniques has led 
some authorities to conclude that science can establish with reasonable medical certainty 
the existence and severity of emotional harm. Recent Developments-Summary Judgment 
Improper Where Plaint(jfr Allege Severe Mental Distress Despite Their Absencefrom Loca­
tion 0/Tortious Activity-Prince v. Pillson Co., 63 GEO. L.J. 1179, 1184-85 (1975). Also 
"[t]here is no reason to believe that the causal connection involved [in emotional injuries] 
is any more difficult for lawyers to prove or for judges and jurors to comprehend than 
many other which occur elsewhere in the law . . . '[I]n any event, difficulty of proof 
should not bar the plaintiff from the opportunity of attempting to convince the trier of 
fact of the truth of her claim.''' Neiderman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 392, 403, 261 A.2d 84, 87 
(1970) (quoting Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 561, 214 A.2d 12, 15-16 (1965». 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment c (1965). "This becomes 
a medical or psychiatric problem, rather than one of law." Id. 
82. For example, social security disability benefits are received for mental disabil­
ity. 20 C.F.R. § 404, 1505 (1983). 
83. PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE 1125-26 (1983). 
84. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,404 A.2d 672 (1979); Samms v. Eccles, II Utah 
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961). 
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and on juries and trial judges to sift evidence in order to determine 
the facts and arrive at proper verdicts .... Experience has shown 
that courts are quite adequate for this task"85 Further, the court has 
stated that "administrative difficulties do not justify the denial of re­
lief for serious invasions of mental and emotional tranquility."86 
Thus, it is clear that the Payton court falls prey to its own criticisms. 
The Payton court has classified negligently inflicted emotional 
distress cases into two categories; one in which physical injury ac­
companies the distress. This classification is both overinclusive and 
underinclusive when viewed in light of its purported purpose of 
screening false claims. It is overinclusive because it permits recovery 
for emotional distress when the suffering accompanies or results in 
any physical injury, however trivial. It is underinclusive because it 
mechanically denies plaintiffs with valid and provable claims access 
to the courts. Payton exemplifies the latter category.87 The objective 
proof that a majority of courts believe is necessary to ensure the 
credibility of a claim was readily available in Payton. Medical 
records could have provided as evidence that the drug was taken and 
that the plaintiffs had undergone painful and potentially traumatic 
examinations.88 It is highly unlikely that these women would go to 
such lengths if they did not experience some mental distress over the 
possibility of contracting cancer or other DES-related illness. 
While the foregoing indicates the court's concern over protect­
ing the interest of the judicial system, it has effectively granted pro­
tection to the interest of alleged tortfeasors. In requiring proof of 
physical harm, the court alleviated its fear of imposing unlimited or 
unduly burdensome liability. Although fear of unlimited liability is 
a valid concern, this concern should be weighed against plaintiffs 
serious emotional injury which has resulted directly from defend­
ant's negligence. It is possible to allay the court's concern by em­
ploying a "duty"89 and "foreseeability"90 analysis. The focus of this 
85. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 363-64, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914-15 (1975). 
86. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 143,355 N.E.2d 315,318 (1976) 
(quoting State Rubbish Collectors Assn v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338-39, 240 P.2d 282, 
286 (1952». 
87. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text. 
88. 386 Mass. at 543, 437 N.E.2d at 172. 
89. Duty has been defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition 
and effect, to confonn to a particular standard of conduct toward another. W. PROSSER, 
supra note 36, § 53, at 331. See also James, Scope 0/Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 778 (1953). 
90. While duty is a question of law,foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury. 
Wierum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975). 
The inquiry is whether it was foreseeable that such hann would occur. See Dillon v. 
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analysis is whether the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff 
instead of whether there is physical injury.91 Foreseeability is a con­
trolling factor in determining one's legal duty.92 If such an analysis 
were applied in Payton, the focus would be on whether manufactur­
ers of DES could have reasonably foreseen that the fetuses of the 
pregnant woman would suffer harm instead of whether they can 
demonstrate physical symptoms.93 
2. Dziokonski 
In refusing to recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress absent physical harm, the Payton court relied 
primarily on its decision in Dziokonski. Dziokonski was a typical 
"bystander" case.94 Thus, it was reasonable for the court to require 
additional evidence of the plaintiffs harm such as physical symp­
toms, given the more tenuous relationship of the plaintiff alleging 
emotional distress due to an injury to a third party.95 
In Payton, however, the plaintiffs were direct victims96 of the 
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Rodriques v. State, 52 Hawaii 
156,472 P.2d 509 (1970). The confines of a defendant's liability are now measured by the 
strictures imposed by negligence theory, i.e. foreseeable risk, threatened danger, and un­
reasonable conduct measured in light of the danger. Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 
435, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103 (1976). 
91. Although the common law has not required every person to be bound by a 
legal duty to every other person, the concept of duty is most often applied in situations 
where persons are in a special relationship, reliance of one person on another is high, and 
it is foreseeable that a person will be endangered by defendant's conduct. E.g., Union 
Pacific Ry. v. Chappier, 66 Kan. 649, 654, 72 P. 281, 283 (1903); Pulka v. Edelman, 40 
N.Y.2d 781, 785-86, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022,390 N.S.2d 393, 396-97 (1976); Riss v. City of 
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 582-83, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861,293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968); 
H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 169-70, 159 N.E. 896, 899 (1928); see 
also, Prosser, Palsgraph ReviSited, 52 MICH. L. REV. (1953); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. 
of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). 
92. A person may be liable "only to those who are foreseeably endangered by [his] 
conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the con­
duct unreasonably dangerous." 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2, at 
1018 (1956). 
93. Jurisdictions have applied such a "foreseeability" standard with successful and 
equitable results. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
95. See also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
96. In certified question three of Payton, the court held that a plaintiff can recover 
damages for injury in utero as a result of her mother's ingestion of a drug. 386 Mass. at 
564,437 N.E.2d at 182. The issue of prenatal injury was first encountered in Massachu­
setts in Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). The Dietrich court denied recov­
ery for prenatal injury on the grounds of lack of precedent and that the unborn child was 
a part of the mother at the time of injury. Thus any damage to it which was not too 
remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her. Id at 17. The court reaffirmed 
the Dietrich rule in Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461 (1950), in which the court stated that 
1052 WESTERN NEW ENGLANf) LAW REVIEW IV01. 6: 1037 
defendant's alleged negligent conduct. Because DES was prescribed 
to the plaintiffs for the prevention of miscarriages it was specifically 
aimed at those who, at the time of ingestion, were fetuses. Despite 
this crucial difference, the Payton court analogized the facts before it 
to Dziokonski and found that because the plaintiffs in Payton 
demonstrated no physical injuries or manifestations, they did not 
meet the standard set forth in Dziokonski: a plaintiff alleging negli­
gent infliction of emotional distress must suffer a substantial physical 
injury as a result of the shock of trauma.97 
Whether Dziokonski was decided correctly is not the controlling 
factor in this analysis. Rather, the court should have focused on 
whether Dziokonski was the correct precedent upon which to base its 
decision. In a situation in which the alleged harm is inflicted directly 
on the plaintiff, the standard should not be the same as when the 
alleged harm is indirect. This issue of negligent infliction of emo­
tional distress of a direct victim is one of first impression in Massa­
chusetts. The court, however, should not have grasped the holding 
of Dziokonski so quickly without taking into consideration the criti­
cal factor that in Dziokonski the plaintiff was a bystander who 
claimed emotional distress resulting from injury to another, while in 
Payton the plaintiff was a direct victim of the alleged negligence. 
3. 	 Distinction Without a Difference-The Physical Injury 
Requirement 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court has clearly indicated its 
reluctance to compensate for emotional distress unaccompanied by 
physical injury when negligently inflicted, Massachusetts has recog­
problems are created by allowing recovery, mainly the difficulty of causation. Id at 462, 
see also Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179 (1952). Subsequently, the 
court in Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633 (1966), held that the administra­
tor of the estate of an infant who dies from injuries suffered in utero was allowed to 
recover for the infant's injuries. Id at 637. The court distinguished f)ietrich on the 
ground that the plaintiff in Keyes was injured after it became viable. Id In Torigan v. 
Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967), the court held that the 
plaintiff's estate stated a cause of action even though the injuries were sustained before 
viability. Id at 448,225 N.E.2d at 927. The court reasoned that the element of specula­
tion was not present to any greater extent than in the usual tort claim. Id at 448-49, 225 
N.E.2d at 927. In Leccesse v. McDonough, 361 Mass. 64,279 N.E.2d 339 (1972), how­
ever, recovery was denied to the administrator of the estate of an infant who was still­
born. In Mone v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975), the court 
overruled Leccesse and stated that stillbirth does not render the measurement of dam­
ages any less capable of calculation than in cases of live birth. Id at 360, 331 N.E.2d at 
920. 	 Thus, Massachusetts now recognizes injury to a fetus as a valid cause of action. 
97. 	 See supra notes 37-44. 
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nized a cause of action for emotional distress unaccompanied by 
physical injury when inflicted recklessly or intentionally. To recover 
for emotional distress absent physical injury in Massachusetts, the 
defendant's conduct must have been "extreme and outrageous," be­
yond all possible bounds of decency" and "utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community."98 The rationale articulated for this standard 
is twofold: First, one whose conduct is extreme and outrageous de­
serves to be punished more so than one who is negligent; and sec­
ondly, such conduct insures the genuineness of the claim.99 
The Supreme Judicial Court held in Agis v. Howard Johnson 
Co. 100 that an employee's severe emotional distress caused by her 
employer's extreme and outrageous conduct in firing her constituted 
a cause of action even though no physical injury resulted.101 The 
court inAgis composed a set of guidelines which purported to allevi­
ate the fear of frivolous litigation. 102 Recently, the supreme judicial 
court reaffirmed its belief that emotional distress is a valid independ­
ent tort worthy of recognition. The court in Simon v. Solomon, 103 
permitted the plaintiff to recover for emotional distress due to the 
damage to her property recklessly caused by the defendant. 104 The 
plaintiff in Simon also alleged negligent infliction of emotional dis­
tress and although the court did not reject the claim, the court 
98. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144, 355 N.E.2d 315, 318 (1976). 
Four elements must be shown to recover for emotional distress absent physical injury: 
(I) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or 
should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his con­
duct. . .; (2) that the conduct was 'extreme and outrageous,' was 'beyond all 
possible bounds of decency' and was 'utterly intolerable in a civilized commu­
nity. . .; (3) that the actions of the defendant were the cause of plaintiffs dis­
tress. . .; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was 
'severe' and of a nature 'that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.' 
Id. at 144-45,355 N.E.2d at 318-19 (citations omitted). 
99. Id. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319. 
100. 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). Plaintiff was fired arbitrarily from her 
position as a waitress when the manager threatened to fire the waitresses in alphabetical 
order until the identity of the person who had been stealing from the restaurant was 
discovered. Id. at 144, 355 N.E.2d at 318. The plaintiff was granted relief for emotional 
distress, mental anguish and loss of wages. Id. at 141, 355 N.E.2d at 317. 
101. Id. at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318. 

\02. Id.; see supra note 99. 

103. 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982). Soloman lived in a low rent apartment 
and when the manager attempted to evict her for nonpayment of rent, Soloman con­
tended that she did not owe any because of the landlord's violation of the "quiet enjoy­
ment" statute. Sewage flooded her apartment thirty times which left her withdrawn, 
depressed, ashamed, unable to work or care for her children. Id. at 93, 431 N.E.2d at 
557. 
104. Id. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562. 
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avoided it on the basis that a sizeable recovery for reckless infliction 
of emotional distress had been awarded which was deemed 
sufficient. 105 
By imposing the physical injury requirement, the supreme judi­
cial court has drawn a distinct line between those cases in which one 
suffers great emotional distress in anticipation of contracting cancer 
and those in which one suffers emotional distress due to employment 
termination or extensive property damage. The arbitrariness of this 
distinction demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing between 
reckless and negligent conduct in emotional distress cases and raises 
the question of whether a significant difference in treatment is war­
ranted. If the court had analyzed Payton in terms of extending the 
recklessness standard instead of relying on j)ziokonski, it would first 
have examined the policy reasons advanced for allowing an emo­
tional distress cause of action without proof of physical injury when 
recklessly inflicted. The main reason for allowing such a cause of 
action is to insure the genuineness of the claim through the degree of 
the defendant's fault. This goal does not appear to be attained by 
allowing plaintiffs to recover for distress due to loss of a job while 
preventing recovery to plaintiffs who can insure the genuineness of 
the claim by medical examinations and tests. Such an example dem­
onstrates the inequitable results of arbitrary line drawing. While 
some may readily and correctly argue that line drawing is necessary 
in judicial decision making, the Payton case may not be an appropri­
ate one in which to drawn such a preclusive line. As Justice Wilkins 
aptly noted in his dissent, the degree of a defendant's fault bears no 
relation to the genuineness or existence of a claim. 106 Therefore, had 
the court examined the rationale and effects of the public policy rea­
sons advanced in favor of a cause of action for recklessly inflicted 
emotional distress absent physical injury, it would have also recog­
nized a cause of action when the injury results from defendant's 
negligence. 
B. Wrongful Life 
The wrongful life issue in Payton was one of first impression in 
Massachusetts. The Payton court, therefore, found it appropriate to 
examine other jurisdiction's rejections of such claims in order to 
place an additional burden on the women allegedly injured by the 
drug DES in their attempts to recover damages. In holding that 
105. Id at 98-99, 431 N.E.2d at 562. 
106. 386 Mass. at 581, 437 N.E.2d at 193 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
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plaintiff would be barred from recovery for physical or emotional dis­
tress suffered as a result of the mother's ingestion of DES if the trier 
of fact concluded that the plaintiff would not have been born had the 
mother never ingested the drug,107 the supreme judicial court 
adopted the defendant's theory that a wrongful life analogy should 
be applied to Payton .108 Because DES was taken to prevent miscar­
riage, defendants asserted that if it had not been for their drug, the 
mother would have miscarried and the plaintiff would not be alive 
today; thus, plaintiff should be content to be alive at all. I09 
A major problem with the majority's decision on the wrongful 
life issue is that the rationale that the courts have used to deny recov­
ery for a wrongful life cause of action is not applicable to the Payton 
facts. As stated by Chief Justice Hennessey in his dissent, wrongful 
life analogies assume that the negligence complained of is a failure 
to warn, 110 typically a doctor's failure to warn a pregnant woman of 
probable birth defect. The plaintiffs in Payton, however, were alleg­
ing inadequate testing of the drug, which renders unnecessary the 
metaphysical calculations involved in wrongful life cases. II I The 
plaintiffs in Payton were not suing the defendants for negligent man­
ufacturing and marketing of a drug that caused unwanted life; 
rather, they were suing for negligent production and promotion of a 
drug that caused cancer and other abnormalities of the reproductive 
tract. 112 Therefore, Chief Justice Hennessey was correct in his asser­
tion that "[t]he harm complained of is not life, but suffering by a 
living person, flowing from negligent conduct toward a potential life. 
These are familiar concepts, and do not require comparisons be­
tween life-with-injury and no-life. . . ." 113 
To overcome the problem of assessing damages, the plaintiffs 
could be awarded damages based on a comparison between the con­
sequences of the defendants' negligence in the promotion of DES as 
a miscarriage preventive and plaintiffs state had the defendants in­
stead, in the exercise of due care, manufactured and marketed a 
product which was safe and fit for its intended purpose. This is the 
typical manner in which damages are measured in an ordinary negli­
107. Id at 557-58, 437 N.E.2d at 181. 
108. Id at 559, 437 N.E.2d at 182. 
109. Id at 557-58, 437 N.E.2d at 181. 
110. Id at 575, 437 N.E.2d at 191 (Hennessey, c.J., dissenting); see supra notes 61­
72 and accompanying text. 
Ill. 386 Mass. at 578, 437 N.E.2d at 192 (Hennessey, c.J., dissenting). 
112. Id at 577-78, 437 N.E.2d at 192 (Hennessey, c.J., dissenting). 
113. Id at 578, 437 N.E.2d at 192 (Hennessey, c.J., dissenting). 
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gence action. I 14 
Even accepting the majority view that a wrongful life analysis 
was appropriate in Payton, the court may not have been justified in 
readily adopting the prevailing view which bars recovery.115 The 
major reasons that have been advanced in opposition to such a 
wrongful life cause of action are: First the difficulty in measuring 
damages, and second that the value of life is so great that any life, 
however impaired, is better than no life at all. 116 With respect to the 
first reason, it offends one's sense ofjustice to think that the difficulty 
of a task should be determinative of whether an injured party may 
be compensated. Courts have been faced with tasks of similar diffi­
culty, such as measuring pain and suffering, and have circumvented 
the problem. ll7 Moreover, the measure of damages in wrongful life 
cases need not be determined by comparing and appraising states of 
life and non-life, but instead damages can be awarded by measuring 
the pain and suffering such a plaintiff endures during his life, in ad­
dition to any special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired 
condition. I IS 
The second major policy reason offered to bar recovery in such 
cases is the fear of disavowing the value of life. I 19 Although few 
people would argue with the importance and pricelessness of human 
life, there is no sound basis for creating an irrebuttable presumption 
at law that any existence is better than nonexistence. 12o The crucial 
focal point is the realization that such plaintiffs exist and suffer due 
to the negligence of others and therefore, we "need not be concerned 
with the fact that had the defendant not been negligent the plaintiff 
might not have come into existence at all."121 
In essence, the court's holding on the wrongful life issue effec­
tively provides a negligent manufacturer of a life sustaining product 
with an excuse from liability whenever it can demonstrate that its 
product probably saved a life. 122 This consequence is inconsistent 
114. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967). 
115. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text. 
116. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
117. See Seifert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498,364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 161 (1961). 
118. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 831, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 477, 469-70 (1980). 
119. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
120. Torts, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 44 Mo. L. REV. 167, 168-69 (1979). 
121. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). 
122. 386 Mass. at 577, 437 N.E.2d at 192. 
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with the fundamental principles of tort liability that a person injured 
by another's negligence is deserving of redress. 123 
Although the court denied recovery on the issue of "wrongful 
life", it will be extremely difficult for the defendants to prove that 
they were in fact responsible for the plaintiffs birth.124 This is of 
little consolation, however, to many women if it is shown by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence that they would not have otherwise been 
born. Perhaps the most frightening factor ofPayton is that it applies 
to both physical and emotional harm. Therefore, even women who 
can prove they have contracted cancer or another disease particular 
to DES, may be barred from recovery on the basis of such a wrong­
fullife analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court in Payton v. Abbott Laboratories 125 has promulgated 
standards and guidelines for the plaintiffs which are difficult, if not 
impossible to meet, in effect leaving women who have been injured 
with no redress, a notion which is contrary to the underlying founda­
tion of tort law. 
Regarding the issue of emotional distress, the Payton court held 
that when such distress is negligently inflicted, it must be accompa­
nied by physical injury to be recoverable. Regarding the issue of 
wrongful life, the Payton court held that "DES Daughters" would be 
barred from recovery for physical or emotional injury suffered as a 
result of their mothers' ingestion of DES if the trier of fact concluded 
that they would not have been born had the mother never ingested 
the drug. If the wrongful life analogy is applied successfully to DES 
cases similar to Payton, the "DES Daughters" will be barred from 
recovery for physical or emotional injury even though there is evi­
dence to prove that such injury was caused by a defendant's 
negligence. 
Judicial conservatism does not call for reaching beyond the 
scope of the problem and applying nonapplicable doctrines. This is 
what the court achieved by ruling that a "wrongful life" analysis was 
appropriate in Payton. The result ofPay.ton is that thousands of wo­
123. For example, doctors who are found negligent are not permitted to escape 
liability although they save lives every day; and rescuers are held liable if they negli­
gently increase the risk of harm to the person they attempt to save. E.g., Robbins v. 
Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d I, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. 505 (1972). 
124. 386 Mass. at 560, 437 N.E.2d at 182. 
125. 386 Mass. 540,437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). 
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men may remain remediless on the theory that they are fortunate to 
be alive at all. 
The ramifications of Payton are simply that women who have 
been affected by a negligently manufactured drug cannot recover for 
their anxiety or mental distress at the prospect of future physical in­
jury; and even women who do demonstrate physical harm may be 
barred from recovery based on a "wrongful life" analysis. 
The real issue presented by Payton is whether the common law 
should adapt to the realities and complexities of contemporary soci­
ety, or leave large numbers of injured Massachusetts women without 
relief. Apparently, the Supreme Judicial Court chose the latter. It is 
disheartening to see the law so close to achieving symmetry between 
judicial thinking and the perils of modem society and then halt ab­
ruptly at a time when it is so crucial. It is critical that the law keep 
abreast of modem medicine, technology, and society if the principles 
of tort law are to continue to have any meaning. 
Nancy E. Laffey 
